

6 August 1976

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH DDCI

SUBJECT: Review of Progress to Date

1. Problem of Lack of Access to NODIS - DDCI reported that the DCI has made some progress with the Secretary of State as far as access by him to selective NODIS traffic. Apparently Eagleburger and Habib have been helpful and it's at this level, if at all, progress will be made on this point.

2. DDCI would like me to concentrate on those elements of the strategic warning and crisis management problem that directly affect CIA, although the Agency's relations with the Community inevitably become involved.

25X1 3. DDCI suggested [] as somebody to talk to in depth on the Angola crisis. (Action: Call [] early next week.)

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5. DDCI is a voting member of NFIB and he wants me to prepare a paper representing the views within the Agency prior to the meeting of NFIB on the National Intelligence Situation Reports.

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25X1 6. DDCI agrees that there continues to be a problem of insuring correct evaluation of DDO agent reporting. He suggested I talk to [] for an informed view of DDI reactions to DDO reporting []. I should also talk to []. He also suggested that on the DDO side I take a look at what effect restrictions on dissemination had on access of analysts to crucial reports and what effect also ambiguous source descriptions may have had.

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7. The Problem of Loss of Institutional Memory - DDCI suggested that I talk to Paul Walsh.

8. Afterwards I filled him in on the status of the Carver Task Force. DDCI stated that before final decision is made as to where to go, a meeting should be held to include DCI, DDCI, [redacted] Carver and myself. 25X

9. I reviewed with him the favorable reaction of the Alert Memoranda procedure and he commented that the Secretary of State is particularly pleased with this device. There is no reason to look further into it.

10. I raised with the DDCI the problem of how we could look ahead through Soviet eyes and identify vulnerable economic, political or military situations that the Soviets might be tempted to exploit given their present perception of American facilities. He said that this definitely was something we should probe further and suggested that I speak to Lehman in the first instance. (Action: Call Lehman early next week.)


11. I mentioned my own ignorance of the tasking problem. He proposed I should seek guidance in the first place from [redacted] and also John Hughes of DoD. [redacted] of the IC Staff would also be helpful. 25X
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12. DDCI came back to the problem/whether or not OCI and OSR analysts were sufficiently alert to their responsibility for providing strategic warning and to what extent they were briefed on warning indicators by SWS.

13. Finally, DDCI is interested in having from me a summary of my findings regarding SWS and particularly my recommendations on the need for an established T/O which he felt was something he can and should act upon.

[redacted]
Cord Meyer, Jr.

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